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AVICENNA’S  
DETERMINSITIC 
THEORY OF ACTION
AND ITS IMPLICATION  FOR A 
THEORY OF 
JUSTICE
By Gabriel Lahood
Abstract
In this essay, two issues are critically addressed, namely, the foundation of 
Avicenna's ethical determinism and its implication for a theory of justice. 
As to the first issue, it regards the analysis of Avicenna’s deterministic theo-
ry notwithstanding his rare but ambiguous use of the free will-suggesting 
terms such as ‘will’, ‘voluntary’, and ‘choice’.  In such a theory, where every-
thing is governed by the laws of pre-established harmony, the ethical evil 
done by man is viewed in the same way physical evil is, as contingent, 
minimal, determined by God, and having its proper function within world 
order and harmony.  As to Avicenna’s justification of punishment, one 
must recognize that Avicenna did not address the issue in its socio-juridi-
cal context.  Rather, he addressed it from a religious point of view, but the 
implication for a theory of social justice seems to be obvious: because of 
universal determinism including man's actions, all threats and promises 
(as well as punishment by human civil courts) have a deterrent function.  
Objections are raised against this deterministic philosophy to show that it 
is founded on a misleading argument of order and harmony.  More objec-
tions are raised to show that Avicenna’s conception of justice, based on 
deterrence, is inhumane and unsatisfactory. 
Introduction
Some of the usual questions that come to mind when facing a deterministic 
ethical theory are: how are, according to this theory, the so-called “voluntary” 
and related concepts interpreted?  And how is, within this theory, man’s so-
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called “evil-doing” evaluated in view of possible retribution?  Avicenna’s ethi-
cal writings provide us with such a theory and confront us with these ques-
tions. Section I of this paper provides an explanation of Avicenna’s determin-
istic ethical theory while section II examines some of its implications. In sec-
tion III, objections to it will be raised. The explanatory part involves clarifying 
how Avicenna conceived of the voluntary, man’s evil-doing, and punishment 
and reward. The implications considered here regard Avicenna’s would-be-
theory of justice as he has nowhere explicitly expressed such a theory. The 
objections to Avicenna’s deterministic ethical theory are raised in respect to 
the unsatisfactory solutions it seems to propose in regard to the presumed 
theory of social justice.
The primary sources that will be referred to here are Risālat Hayy bin Yaqzān 
(abbrev. H), Risālat al-Qadar (abbrev. Q), Risālah fi Sirr al-Qadar (abbrev. S), 
and Ilāhiyyāt (abbrev. I). 
I- Avicenna’s Deterministic Theory
Although Avicenna uses the terms ‘will’ (irādah) and ‘voluntary’ (irādī), his 
understanding of these terms differs from that of Aristotle and ordinary peo-
ple. While ordinary people’s understanding of the voluntary consists in con-
ceiving it, as Aristotle has expressed it -- an act based on knowledge and unob-
structed choice -- Avicenna explains both knowledge and choice by reference 
to causes that are beyond man’s control. 
Avicenna describes the will as the faculty to deliberate (rawiyyah) (I, 45.), to 
make  choices (ikhtiyār) (I, 40), and to perform voluntary movement (harakah 
irādiyyah) (I, 37). However, Avicenna's description of the will appears to be 
manifestly deterministic when he uses the term gharīzah (instinct) to include 
the intellectual and volitional faculties as well as the merely animal instincts. 
In fact, he uses this term in the context of animal behavior (“The animals are 
endowed with instinctive inspirations.” I, 184) and man’s intellectual process 
of comprehending  the intelligibles (macqūlāt) (I, 237). This seems to suggest 
that the animal’s “will” is moved by the animal's instinct; and that human will 
is moved by the “intellect’s instinct” (gharīzat al-caql). 
 
Avicenna clarifies the issue by referring to “causes” (cilal) that move the will 
(‘irāda), a term that Avicenna, according to Goichon (1938, nr. 282, referring to 
Avicenna’s Najāt (abbrev. N), Cairo’s edition of 1913, page 393), does not spe-
cifically define: “Elle [‘irāda, volonté] n’est définie nulle part, ce qui eut été bien 
intéressant dans ce système o tout est nécessaire.”  And these causes can be sen-
sual desires (shahawāt), anger (ghadab), a belief (zann), or knowledge (cilm). 
Thus, choice (ikhtiyār) occurs, on the one hand, when the will is moved by 
bodily causes, in which case it is called “sensual will” (irādah issiyyah): 
‘Ikhtiyār, choix, mais non pas nécessairement libre et volontaire; choix 
instinctif et choix réfléchi, celui-ci étant ordinairement précisé par un 
adjective. Voici quatre sortes d’ikhtiyār: Ce qui cherche la déléctation est la 
volupté; ce qui cherche la victoire est la colère; ce qui cherche le bien et vrai 
est l’intelligence, et cette recherche s’appelle choix. Goichon (1938, 115, nr. 
234). Here, Goichon quotes N (Cairo ed., 1913, 430) and I, IX, 2, f. 103, r.1. 
On the other hand, when the will is moved by intellectual causes,  in which 
case it is called “intellectual will” (irādah caqliyyah), it also triggers choice (See 
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entries “volonté sensible” and “volonté intellectuelle,” in Goichon (1938, 147, nr. 
282) quoting Ishārāt (ed. J. Forjet, Leide 1892, 135). However, according to 
Avicenna, the intellect of man is moved by a higher intellect, the active intel-
lect, an angelic or divine intellect that is outside of man and beyond man's 
control. Thus, when man’s will is moved by his intellect, it is essentially moved 
by the (outside) active intellect, and when the will is moved by bodily faculties, 
needs, or instincts, it is moved by forces beyond his control also.
 
The process by which man's will is moved by the bodily, or lower, faculties is 
illustrated in an allegorical account, H, where the major personage, called 
Hayy ibn Yaqzān, represents the active intellect. This personage is described 
there as a wise old man who possesses knowledge of all sciences (al-culūm 
kullaha): 
‘Quant mon nom et ma famille,’ me répondit-il, ‘je m’appelle Hayy b. 
Yaqzân, et ma ville natale est Jérusalem; quant  mon métier, il consiste à 
errer dans toutes les régions de la terre en suivant toujours la direction don-
née par mon pre, qui m’a confié les clés de toutes les sciences et m’a guidé sur 
les sentiers de toutes les contrées du monde jusqu’à ce que j’aie atteint les 
confins les plus réculés de l’univers.’  H, in Traîté, I, French paraphrase, page 
11 / Arabic text, page 3. 
Hayy explains to Avicenna and his companion--both of whom represent two 
human (passive) intellects--how the emotions, such as pleasure (ladhdhah), 
anger (ghadab), or imagination (wahm), move the desire (shawq), which in 
turn causes the will ('ira-dah) to cause us to act: “Hādha wa-l-qadar min niyyat 
al-rajul wa camauhu hādha al-qadar...”
Nous voyons donc que le destin est le moteur de l'intention et l’exécuteur de 
l'action humaine; c’est lui qui, en maître absolu, s’attaque à la fragile 
demeure de l’homme, par toutes espèces d’artifices [c'est--dire les tentations 
du monde sensible], bien que l’entrée en soit défendue par des gardiens 
[c’est--dire les facultés intellectuelles de l’homme]... Q, in Traités, IV, Fr. 5 / 
Ar. 10. Presently, I am preparing a translation of, with notes and an intro-
duction to, Avicenna’s essay Risālat al-Qadar, which is expected to be of 
more service to Avicennian scholarship than this French paraphrase. 
Certainly, man may feel he is and claim to be the exclusive author of his acts, 
but according to Hayy, man acts like one who is asleep (al-nā’im) believing 
himself to be self-moving (taharīkuha minhu): “Wa al-nā’imu qad yuhissu bi-
l-ladhati ihsāsan... wa sanahātuhu tuharriku min shawqihi tahrīkuha 
minhu...” 
Ainsi l’homme, en général, se trouve entre l’état de veille et de sommeil; 
tantôt il est surexcité par la fantaisie, tantôt par une opinion indécise, 
tantôt enfin par le désir, qui, uni la force de l’intention et secondé par des 
impulsions, maîtrise tout  la fois et produit le mouvement de l'action... Q, in 
Traits, IV, Fr. 6 / Ar. 12-13. 
Thus, there is in man a chain of (unconscious) internal (bātin) processes that 
determine his will to produce caused acts (wa afcāluka natā’ijun): “fakhudh 
min hādha kullihi anna irādataka mūjabatun wa afcālaka natā’ijun...” 
De tout cela il faut conclure que ta volonté est contrainte, et que les actions 
la suivent... Q, in Traits, IV, Fr. 7 / Ar. 16. 
Among these faculties of the soul, there is the highest faculty, being the intel-
lect, and there are the lower faculties, being the other faculties. The lower 
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faculties are described by Hayy as “companions” (rufaqā’), with which the 
human intellect is “traveling” through the worldly life: 
Pendant mon séjour dans mon pays, je me sentis disposé faire avec mes 
amis une petite excursion aux lieux de plaisance du voisinage, et tout en 
flânant je rencontrai un vieillard, qui, malgré son âge bien avancé, était 
plein d'une ardeur juvénile... H, in Traités, I, Fr. 11 / Ar. 1. 
At times, these companions are capricious, exhibiting desires that are not 
always compatible with the dictates of the intellect. Irascibility is their com-
mon attribute, and therefore, they may become wild (ahwāj) and ought to be 
restrained: 
Mais voil ton compagnon de droite [l’irascibilité] il est encore plus impétu-
eux et ses attaques ne se peuvent que bien difficilement repousser par la 
raison, ou éloigner par la dextérité. Also: Gardes-toi bien de leur lâcher les 
brides et de t’abandonner  leur volonté. H, in Traités, I, Fr. 13 / Ar. 5. 
Consequently, the unavoidability of “traveling” with such “companions” 
makes the “journey” of the intellect with the other faculties of the soul one of 
struggle. Sometimes, the intellect has the upper hand, and sometimes the 
other faculties do: “fatāratan lī al-yadu wa tāratan lahā calayya”
Il faut donc te contenter d'un voyage interrompu de temps en temps; tantôt 
tu feras route, tantôt tu t’abandonneras  tes compagnons. H, in Traités, I, Fr. 
14 / Ar. 6. 
Such a deterministic theory of action has serious implications on interpreting 
man’s evil-doing in the context of a theory of justice. 
II- Implications for a Theory of Justice
Implications for Man’s Evil-Doing and Retribution
There are two major implications of Avicenna's determinism that concern us 
here: one regards his implied conception of man's good or evil deeds (that 
man's good and evil deeds are determined), and the other regards his implied 
justification of the subsequent reward or punishment (that man cannot be 
rewarded or punished on a retributive basis). 
 
Before investigating why, according to Avicenna, man cannot (freely) choose 
to do evil and what the implications of such a claim for a theory of justice are, 
it is important, to understand how he conceived of evil in general. Such an 
understanding will in turn help clarify Avicenna's conception of evil done by 
man as being an act that is traceable back to powers beyond man's control, 
and fitting within Avicenna’s principle of universal order and harmony. 
 
According to Avicenna, evil can be metaphysical, physical, or ethical, and 
among these forms of evil, the evil par excellence is the metaphysical. 
The Metaphysical Evil
The metaphysical evil consists in the deprivation of existence. However, the 
deprivation of existence--and thus the deprivation of any form of actual 
goodness--cannot be attributed to anything that exists, and therefore, this evil 
does not exist as such. 
As to the physical and ethical evils, they are minor evils. They exist only con-
tingently, and they are integral parts of the universal organization and har-
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mony. Among the physical evils, Avicenna identifies pain (alam) and the 
deprivations (nuqsān) of limbs. And among the ethical evils, Avicenna identi-
fies blameworthy deeds (afcāl madhmūmah) and worries (gham) (I, 419).
 
The Physical Evil
The physical evil caused, for example, by fire when it burns the cloth of an 
honest man, thus causing him pain, does not necessarily make it an evil thing. 
By its nature, fire is to heat, burn, and possibly cause pain, otherwise it would 
not be fire (I, 418). Thus, fire is good and has a proper function within world 
order. It may, however, become relatively evil but only in relation to a specific 
individual or thing under specific circumstances. Also, the fact that fire can 
cause a contingent evil would not affect the basic goodness of fire. Similarly, 
the sun is not an evil thing even though it may cause some individuals to have 
headaches when they expose their unprotected heads excessively to it. Also, 
water, which is a source of life, may suffocate living beings. Furthermore, sick-
ness and decay, which are usually labeled as evil occurrences, have their 
proper function in the world, and therefore they are good as necessary condi-
tions of world order. 
The Ethical Evil
As for the ethical evil, Avicenna describes in H how the lower faculties of man 
can overpower and, thus, corrupt the higher faculties that, in turn, lead man 
to commit ethical evil. The corruption of the faculties takes place when one of 
a lower nature overpowers one of the higher faculties. In this case, the faculty 
that takes the lead, be it a lower or a higher faculty, can be said to cause man 
to act. Then, man is said to be determined to act either by his intellect or by 
his other faculties. If, then, man is determined anyway, how would Avicenna 
justify reward and punishment, whether in the hereafter or in this world?  
 
Avicenna’s Justification of the so-called Retribution
Although Avicenna did not address the question as to the function of ethical 
commandments, threats, promises, and actual administration of punishment 
or reward in the context of civil law, he addressed it succinctly but insightfully 
in the religious context. Thus, an understanding of the latter will yield an 
understanding of the former. 
Avicenna wanted to say in S, contrary to what Muslim theologians 
(mutakallimūn) had believed, that man's actions are determined and that 
reward and punishment should not be understood in the retributive sense as 
deserved punishments or rewards that would be imparted by God in the here-
after. Rather, they are mere natural consequences of the actions that man has 
performed in this life. But if so, how would Avicenna interpret, as a Muslim, 
the Qur’anic verses that clearly claim the retributive function of the threats of 
eternal punishment and the promises of eternal reward? The attempt to make 
sense out of these apparently opposing views would constitute for Avicenna 
an attempt to unlock “the secret of destiny” (sirr al-qadar). If man is deter-
mined, and there is punishment and reward in the hereafter, it would seem 
that God would be the judge who condemns and rewards. But if this is the 
case, then God would be unjust in condemning those who are determined to 
do evil. How, then, could Avicenna profess, as a Muslim, determinism and 
defend God's justice?  His strategy was to deny that God judges, and to do so, 
he had to reinterpret the Qur’anic “punishments” and “rewards.” The Qur’anic 
threats of punishment and promises of reward are, according to him, causes 
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that could move man to act in a certain way. Also, the subsequent “punish-
ment” and “reward” are merely natural consequences of deeds done on earth, 
not consequences imposed by a judging God. In fact, Hayy, the major pro-
tagonist of the allegory Q, rejected the belief that God ought to reward with 
eternal happiness those who do good deeds: “faman cazalaka can al-’irjā’i 
khā’iban, wa sawwala laka al-qawla bi-t-takhlīdi wā jiban?”  (“Who deprived 
you of hope and left you disappointed, and who allowed you to claim eternal 
felicity as a duty [of God towards you]?” --translation by the author of the pres-
ent article-- Q, in Traités, IV, 16-17). The so-called “reward” is a human expres-
sion to indicate, though improperly, God’s generosity, not a deserved reward 
or a returned favor: “innahu tacāla yuthbitu fadlan, lā isqāta fadlin.” (He 
[God], the Exalted[,] endows favors. [He has] no favors to return [to anybody]. 
--author’s translation-- Q, in Traités, IV, 22). In other words, God created the 
universe and man in it out of nothing. Thus, their existence is not a result of 
their deserving to exist, but a result of God’s generosity. By His act of creation, 
God also brought about natural laws that run the universe harmoniously 
towards a specific universal destiny. Similarly, he also created natural laws that 
run man’s affairs harmoniously towards a specific human destiny. Obviously, 
God could have created a different universe and a different man with different 
laws of their destinies. Thus, neither the universe nor man may claim the right 
to anything other than what each is destined to. Notwithstanding this deter-
minism, ayy reassures us not to give up hope in the possibility of gaining eter-
nal happiness.
  
The ethical and juridical implications of such a deterministic conception of 
universal harmony is that one would have to ignore the Qur’anic teaching on 
(free) choice and final retribution, which is a heresy; and one would always 
have to absolve the so-called “criminal” from any crime, guilt, and punish-
ment, which would invite more crimes and would be contrary to common 
sense justice. Avicenna would address such ethical implications saying that 
what we believe to be self-motivated “choice” is nothing but a psychological 
cause-effect process similar to the physical cause-effect process, both of 
which are preordained by the Qur’anic God. He would also address the legal 
implication saying that human justice would, like divine justice, not have a 
retributive but a deterrent function. That is, the punishment reaped would not 
be deserved, but would forcefully direct the individual or the society to avoid 
future evil-doing. Such a deterministic ethical theory and its implications are 
not without problems. 
III- Objections
Avicennian God’s Justice Questioned
In this Avicennian deterministic framework, God is implied to be not only all-
powerful, all-generous, and just, but also sarcastic and unjust. He creates man 
out of nothing, endows him with knowledge and will, but He capriciously des-
tines him without fault of his own to eternal tribulation. The justification of 
such a sad destiny is that God’s justice is not to be compared with human jus-
tice: “wa laisa ka’l-wāhid minna yuncimu liqadā’i haqqin.” (“He is not like us 
who rewards for the sake of justice”--Author’s translation--) (Q, Ar. 17). Mehren 
renders this idea in his paraphrase with more details: 
La récompense de l’autre vie ne doit pas être considérée comme un salaire, 
mais comme un don gratuit de la grâce divine, et les menaces de punition 
s’adouciront et s’effaceront par la clémence de Dieu. (Q, p, 7) 
Certainly to hear of “a gratuitous gift on the part of God’s grace” as described 
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in Q, shows that God is generous, but, God’s “gratuitous” punishment shows 
that He is also sarcastic and unjust.
Avicennian God’s Truthfulness and Honesty Questioned
Avicenna’s God seems to be also a deceitful God who “blesses” people and 
induces them into error, which fact, if it were the case, would not be a blessing 
at all. This seems to be the case of the rationalist friend of Avicenna who would 
be deceitfully called by Hayy, the active or divine intellect, “blessed” (mubārak/
bārika lahu) if he were to listen, whether convinced or not, to Avicenna’s softer 
speech. This may be so when in fact he was induced and confirmed in error 
(in believing that truth is reached by means of reason alone). Hayy said to 
him: 
wa’idha ramaqta [Avicenna] amthālahum [Avicenna’s friend and other 
rationalists]  bicayn al-rahma wa alqaita calaihim al-ra’fa būrika laka wa 
lahum. (Q, 5) (If you [Avicenna] addressed the sick in their souls [Avicenna’s 
friend and other rationalists] softly and gently,  you and they would be 
blessed [in what you would be trying to teach them].) Author’s transla-
tion. 
If this individual would be, “blessed” by God, may, nonetheless, be confirmed 
in error and possibly into eternal tribulation, he would not truly be blessed in 
any sense of the word. It would thus be a frightful situation where one strug-
gles (or is led to struggle) to find truth or do good and finally gives up (or is led 
to give up) just because God decreed for him a specific gloomy destiny, and 
thus he would end up innocently with an everlasting suffering. Moreover, if 
God’s Qur’anic promises of reward and His threats of punishment were only 
means to force people to act in a certain way, then these exhortations would 
in fact be deceitful and thus they would be lies, and God would, therefore, be 
dishonest: 
wa kama lam ’ajidu buddan min al-tahrīd...la ’ajidu buddan min at-tarhīb.. 
(Q, 18) -- le maître n'eût promis la récompense en or et émeraudes que 
comme moyen d’exhortation et menacé des supplices et de la croix que pour 
éloigner du mal, il se mit à conférer et  faire subir les peines. (Q, 8)
 
God would also be a liar, because He would have promised something which 
He would not fulfill. And He would furthermore be dishonest because when 
He promises people who do good eternal happiness, He would not really be 
promising a reward. Rather He would simply be forcefully leading them by 
means of natural forces to do good.
Avicenna’s Possible Defense and Rebuttal
Suppose Avicenna objects to this by saying that God’s justice is totally different 
from human justice and the two cannot be equated: 
‘alaysa muftāka alladhi sammaytahu caqlan wa jacaltahu ’aslan yaqūlu 
laka laytaka tawaqqafta qalīlan wa ta’ammalta... lā tadrub lillāhi 
al-amthāla wa lā tajcalahu gharad... al-qiyās. ( Q, 18-19) — Mehren para-
phrases this saying: (Maintenant, après avoir entendu cette parabole,) ta 
raison qui t’a servi de guide, te reprochera probablement de n’avoir pas 
assez réfléchi... abandonne cette assimilation de l’Être suprême à la créa-
ture... (Q, 9). 
If so, one should ask him whether, in his opinion, God’s rationality, that in turn 
generates God’s sense of justice, is totally different from our rationality and 
our sense of justice. Contrary to Avicenna’s assumption, I think it would make 
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more sense to assume that man’s rationality and his sense of justice should not 
contradict, or be totally different from, God’s rationality and His sense of jus-
tice. Avicenna’s God, in sharing with man a rationality that is inconsistent with 
His own rationality, would be inconsistent Himself and, thus, He would be less 
perfect than He is claimed or expected to be. In other words, if God’s rational-
ity is the source of our rationality--as He is the Ultimate Active Intellect that 
ultimately illuminates all intellects--then His rationality, including His con-
ception of justice, though more perfect than ours, should not be inconsistent 
with, or totally different from, ours. 
Again, Avicenna’s God seems to be inconsistent. He is claimed to create pur-
posely but there is one event he created without a purpose, namely, man’s 
consciousness of his own free choice. Avicenna does not justify why God 
bestowed on man such an apparently useless power to discover the sad “truth” 
about himself, that he is determined in this world to do evil and is predestined 
to suffer eternally in the hereafter. Self-consciousness, if it has any purpose, 
should be a motive for man to change his own conduct and should be a good 
reason for claiming that man can be the agent of his actions.
  
Moreover, God appears in Avicenna’s theory as an unjust God. In such a theo-
ry, a criminal is created criminal. That is, he is destined in this life to be such 
and, furthermore, he is predestined in the hereafter to suffer eternal pain. Any 
reasonable person would resent the possibility of God, the supposedly model 
of justice, determining a man to be a criminal and reserving for him eternal 
suffering. Human intellect (reason), as an Avicennian emanation of God’s 
intellect, should dictate that such a behavior would, if it were the case, be 
unjust, and God would be a sadist if He were to allow the innocent to know 
that he is innocent and nonetheless he is destined to suffer without fault on 
his part. No doubt, one’s ethical evil, such as the creation by God of one born-
to-be-condemned individual, may be insignificant in the eyes of God when 
compared to the good in the universe. But when eternal damnation of an indi-
vidual endowed with an intellect and a will is at stake, such an insignificance 
becomes for this concerned individual as important as order and harmony in 
the whole universe is to God. Consequently, to predestine, or rather to con-
demn, such a man to "eternal tribulation" would show that God is unjust. 
 
Consequently, the statement by Hayy as to the necessity of not losing hope in 
gaining eternal felicity is certainly encouraging, but the knowledge that God 
can be capricious, deceitful,  inconsistent, and unjust is so frightful that it can 
easily overshadow the invitation to hope in God's generosity and mercy: 
faman cazalaka can al-’irjv’i khā’iban wa sawwala laka al-qawla bi-t-
takhlīdi wājiban[?] Q, 16-17 — Au contraire si tu considères Dieu comme 
élevé au dessus de toute comparaison humaine, es-tu sûr qu’il t’a privé de 
tout espoir de salut, ou qu’il t’a garanti sa récompense comme nécessité? (Q, 
8). 
 
Also, if the fate of inanimate and animate beings is determined and fits prop-
erly within the Avicennian universal order and harmony (where everything 
has a purpose), what is the purpose, for world order and harmony, of the fact 
that man resents the punishing of the innocent?  
The parable related by Hayy to Avicenna and his friend of the rich landlord 
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and his servants appears to be misleading as it suggests that man can make 
choices, while man is nothing but a determined machine. If this landlord 
rewards those who obey and punishes those who are delinquent, then it must 
also be assumed that when the landlord ordered them to work and produce, 
he presupposed the capacity of these servants to choose whether to obey or to 
disobey. That is, these servants must have some free will to obey or disobey. 
And it is for this same reason that they are responsible for complying with, or 
breaking, the landlord’s orders. 
Furthermore, the order of Hayy at the end of the allegory for men to “act 
[according to God’s dictates], so that [they] will be favored with the success for 
which they have been created [i.e., destined]” (author’s translation) suggests 
free will: 
Icmalu fakullun muyassar lahu lima khuliqa lahu. (Q, 25) — Travaillez tou-
jours, chacun de vous sera favorisé du succès, s’il ne force pas sa nature! (Q, 
12) 
 
If ethical evil is, like the physical evil, governed by mechanical-like causality, 
how then is one to interpret the fact that man does in fact feel pain when mak-
ing certain decisions?  Although Avicenna does not seem to have answered 
this question, he would still be consistent in saying that deliberation and pain-
ful decisions are, like anything else, causally ordered. But if this were the case, 
one might further ask: what is the purpose, for the claimed world order, of 
one's remorse and belief that one could have acted otherwise?  One might 
presume Avicenna’s answer to be that remorse and belief in being able to act 
otherwise are nothing but determining causes, and these too fit within univer-
sal order and harmony. If so, man’s belief in his being determined no matter 
what he does would rather make him follow the easier slope and do evil if he 
is tempted and he feels like slipping. 
When applying Avicenna’s teaching about man’s so-called “choice” in courts of 
justice, we may say that on Avicennian grounds, the offender of the law is 
actually innocent (because he or she has no choice but to do what he or she is 
compelled to do), and nonetheless the Avicennian prosecutor would think it 
is reasonable and acceptable to have the offender tried, and eventually pun-
ished on the basis that punishment would deter either the offender himself in 
the future, if there is any future in this world for him, or any other potential 
offenders. However, the consequence of such a theory of justice is that pros-
ecutors and judges would be allowed to have innocent people punished, if 
such a punishment would, if ever, deter somebody. Here, one can easily see 
how many innocent people would thus unjustly be punished. 
Such a deterministic outlook suggests that Avicenna would agree to impose, in 
civil courts of justice, punishment on the individual who is known to be deter-
mined. The mentally or physically impaired would, by the way, be liable to 
punishment as any hardened criminal. Thus, Avicenna would eventually pun-
ish the innocent in order to deter others from committing evil-doing. His 
justification would be that such an evil (punishing the innocent) is insignifi-
cant when compared to universal order and harmony. 
Conclusion
Having these objections or considerations in mind, one should, contrary to 
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Avicenna, find man’s belief that he can act freely and responsibly not only 
more likely to be true, but indeed imperatively so, in light of the belief in a just 
God, a just society, and a more harmonious universal order. 
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Avicenna, Risālah fī sirr al-qadar, translated into English and edited by George 
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